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A Regional Approach 
MINe AND UXO RISk ReDUcTION IN VIeTNAM, LAOS AND cAMBODIA
Since Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have similar mine and unexploded ordnance risk 
problems, a regional approach may contribute to finding solutions for these three. 
Understanding common features and challenges is a first step toward reducing the num-
ber of casualties in the region.
2005 marks the 30th anniversary of the end of the conflict variously called, depend-
ing on the speaker’s perspective, the “Vietnam War,” 
“American War” or “Second Indochina War,” encompass-
ing Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. All sides and observ-
ers agree the conflict was one of the most costly in world 
history in terms of loss of human life and use of military 
ordnance, including bombs and mines of all kinds. Thirty 
years later, while significant cleanup of this ordnance has 
taken place—first by regional governments, then through 
international non-governmental organizations, corpora-
tions and bilateral donors—landmines and unexploded 
ordnance still kill or maim over 1,000 people each year in 
the three Indochina countries. Why does this still occur? 
What can be done to educate people about the risk from 
mines and UXO, or reduce it by other means, so that no 
more new casualties take place?
These were among the questions posed at a regional 
workshop on landmine and UXO risk education in the 
Mekong subregion, held in Siem Reap, Cambodia, in 
November 2004. This workshop, cosponsored by the 
Fund for Reconciliation and Development (a U.S.-based 
NGO) and the Cambodian Red Cross, brought together 
75 practitioners and program managers from the three 
Indochina countries, as well as Afghanistan, Burma, 
Sri Lanka and Thailand. UNICEF-Vietnam, Catholic 
Relief Services and Consortium—Laos provided addi-
tional funding support. Through presentations, small 
group discussions and a collective writing exercise, par-
ticipants identified best practices, lessons learned and 
recommendations for mine and UXO risk education 
across national boundaries.
It goes without saying that each country in the region 
is different economically, politically and geographically. 
However, UXO and mine contamination in the three 
countries share common features due to their specific 
historical experiences in the 1960s and 1970s and subse-
quent development. 
UXO Versus AP Mine Contamination
The primacy of UXO contamination over that of anti-
personnel mines is overwhelmingly prevalent in Laos and 
Vietnam, where national and local surveys have found 
that over 90 percent—and up to as high as 97 percent—
of remaining ordnance in the ground consists of cluster 
bombs, grenades, aircraft bombs, shells, rockets and other 
UXO, not landmines. Less commonly known is the fact 
that this is also true in most of Cambodia, where UXO 
casualties now exceed AP mine casualties by a factor of 2-
or 3-to-1. With the exception of the K5 mine belt along 
Cambodia’s border with Thailand, the remainder of the 
country shows patterns of contamination quite similar to 
those in Laos and Vietnam. 
In contrast to AP mines, which are “always on” and are 
designed to explode at the slightest touch, many pieces 
of UXO appear inactive and may remain so until repeat-
edly struck or tampered with. Others are highly unstable 
and could respond differently to stimuli depending on 
the time and environment. Many pieces of ordnance can 
be handled repeatedly without exploding, but this offers 
no guarantee for the next person who encounters them. 
Cluster bomblets—the ubiquitous BLU 26/36 “bom-
bies” dropped in immense quantities up and down the 
former Ho Chi Minh Trail and on other aerial bombing 
targets—are particularly sensitive to handling due to their 
fuse mechanisms. 
Incidents involving UXO frequently claim multiple 
victims, as shrapnel may be scattered over a wide area, 
and cause upper-body injuries, burns, and/or blindness 
to survivors—a profile divergent from the single-victim, 
lower-limb amputation consequences of many AP mine 
explosions. Furthermore, the pieces of UXO themselves 
are not laid in minefields but can be found randomly. 
Facing no alternative, people continue to plant in UXO-
contaminated fields, hunt and gather in contaminated 
forests and live in contaminated villages. When encoun-
tering UXO, they walk around, use local marking meth-
ods or move UXO to a more out-of-the-way location. 
Thus, traditional AP mine risk education messages 
such as “don’t touch,” “don’t move,” “report to the au-
thorities” are neither appropriate nor effective in areas 
with mainly UXO contamination. Local people have 
been touching and moving UXO for decades, and many 
feel (rightly or wrongly) they know how to do so safely. 
Moreover, there may not be authorities to report to or, if 
there are, they will not respond without payment and/or 
a long wait.
As a consequence, several international mine action 
organizations in Cambodia and Laos are experimenting 
with programs to involve villagers in clearance activities 
and in developing new MRE messages. “Village demin-
ing” or “villager-assisted clearance” remains controversial 
in the mine action community owing to safety (and liabil-
ity) concerns. Community-based education, by contrast, 
is widely accepted and formed a key part of discussions in 
the November 2004 regional workshop.
Tampering—The Main Cause  
of UXO Casualties 
“Tampering” means deliberate handling of ordnance 
with the goal of extracting metal and/or explosives. This 
is often referred to as, or lumped together with, scrap 
metal collecting. With no other employment options, 
adult males living in contaminated areas search for UXO, 
remove it from the ground and sell it to local dealers, who 
then remove the valuable metal and explosives for resale 
and sometimes export. In some cases, children are also 
involved, either as passive observers or active participants. 
International organizations working in Savannakhet 
province, Laos, have documented recruitment of chil-
dren to search for and remove scrap metal. Adults and 
children carrying cheap metal detectors are a common 
sight along the Lao-Vietnam border and in other con-
taminated areas. 
Reports from all three countries indicate that anywhere 
from 30 to 80 percent of UXO casualties result from 
tampering. The actual numbers may be even higher, as 
many survey respondents provide unlikely answers, such 
as “nothing happened—it just exploded,” that could be 
cover stories for tampering. Scrap-metal collecting is not 
illegal in itself, but handling of explosives is, and survivors 
may fear that they will not receive assistance if they admit 
to handling live ordnance. In any case, observers attribute 
the roughly 50-percent increase in casualties noted in 2004 
entirely to increased tampering. The report from Phase I 
of the Vietnam national impact survey, being carried out 
by the Ministry of Defense Engineering Command and 
the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, is expected 
to confirm these findings.
Given that tampering is an economic activity, why 
is it increasing at a time when economic development is 
occurring in the countries of Indochina as never before? 
The simplest answer is that scrap and explosives collec-
tors are not benefiting equally from economic growth. 
Meanwhile, increased demand for metal and explosives in 
the construction, mining and timber industries, among 
others, has raised the sale price of these items to new 
highs. New roads are providing easy access to heavily con-
taminated areas that have not been populated or exploited 
since the war. Additionally, metal detectors have become 
cheaper and more easily available. 
The tampering crisis is difficult to resolve using tra-
ditional mine risk education messages. Most people, or 
at least most adults, involved in the scrap trade are fully 
aware of the risks they are taking but proceed regard-
less. Solutions must include economic and livelihood 
components as well as UXO-specific ones. Among the 
suggestions raised in the 2004 regional workshop were 
the following:
• Expand common development strategies to other 
organizations working in the same areas; integrate 
MRE with economic development activities.
• Share experiences and lessons learned by commu-
nities affected by UXO with others, for instance 
survivors visiting the homes of scrap dealers.
• Involve scrap collectors in village MRE and mine 
action activities.
• Provide alternative vocational training and job 
placement services.
Need for Data-gathering 
and Assistance to New Survivors
From a public health and injury prevention perspec-
tive, current casualty risks in all three countries are rela-
tively low in comparison to other injuries, especially road 
Yei marcher: A laywoman marches during Mine Awareness Day in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
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A Cambodian woman and her child 
walk past a mine field to collect water in 
Kompong, Speu, southern Cambodia, April 
1, 2000. Mines stifle economic activity in 
Cambodian villages and endanger lives.
by Andrew Wells-Dang
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accidents (which claimed the lives of 6,000 Vietnamese in 
the first half of 2005 alone). Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
do have among the highest numbers of mine and UXO 
survivors in the world, but most of these were injured 
during or immediately after conflicts that have now been 
over for decades. In Vietnam especially, the population of 
mine/UXO survivors is aging, posing a new set of health 
challenges for government agencies and non-governmental 
organizations involved in their care.
Nevertheless, there is a compelling case for continuing 
to collect information and provide assistance to new vic-
tims as well. First, there are still significant numbers of new 
deaths and injuries each year; since 2000, these have aver-
aged approximately 800 per year in Cambodia (with full 
reporting), 200 in Vietnam and 100 in Laos (with incom-
plete reporting). Cambodia ranks no. 3 or no. 4 worldwide 
in reported casualties, Vietnam around no. 10 and Laos 
between no. 15 and 20, depending on the year. Each ca-
sualty affects not only the individuals involved, but also 
their families and communities, frequently with devastat-
ing effects on family finances through medical bills, trans-
portation costs and lost income. Thus, while longer-term 
survivors may have adapted to their injuries, new survivors 
and their families, as well as the families of those killed by 
mines and UXO, face immediate costs and challenges.
Second, the historical circumstances of the Indochinese 
conflict offer clear moral reasons for increased assistance. 
The U.S. government and NGOs as representatives of the 
American people have a particular 
responsibility, given that the vast 
majority of remaining lethal ord-
nance is of U.S. origin, certainly 
in Laos and Vietnam, and also in 
eastern and central Cambodia. 
Among the populations most at 
risk are the poorest, ethnic mi-
nority groups and those living in 
remote areas—which are often 
overlapping categories. Indeed, mines and UXO form one 
of the obstacles these groups face toward equitable, sustain-
able development together with national majorities. 
What does this analysis suggest for mine action pro-
grams and the international donor community? First, 
reduction of risk—not area cleared or numbers of ord-
nance—should become the primary objective of all mine/
UXO action activities. In most situations, given limited 
resources, this means foregoing expensive site-clearance 
operations in favor of mobile explosive ordnance removal 
and small-scale, community-level clearance. Many interna-
tional agencies are already taking steps in this direction. A 
subsequent step, again being pioneered by several existing 
operators, is the formation of UXO-specific operating pro-
cedures, rather than simply applying anti-personnel mine 
terminology and techniques to what is in most places a dis-
tinctly different problem. This applies as strongly to mine 
risk education programs.
The regional workshop in Siem Reap also recommend-
ed closer cooperation in MRE and mine clearance among 
the Mekong subregion and neighboring countries, with 
specific emphasis on accurate data on mine/UXO con-
tamination and casualties. Where information is lacking 
or inadequate, additional field surveys and mine marking 
should be conducted to better target MRE interventions. 
The Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System 
(CMVIS) has proven to be an effective tool in monitor-
ing casualties and ensuring full reporting nationwide. Laos, 
which also has a national program with significant interna-
tional assistance, will implement a similar system, tenta-
tively titled LUMVIS, in late 2005 or early 2006. 
Surprisingly, given its size and level of development, 
Vietnam remains the most difficult of the three countries 
in which to gather and share information. The challenge in 
Vietnam is how to expand successful models of coopera-
tion in several central provinces to other parts of the coun-
try that are also heavily affected by UXO and landmines, 
particularly along the south-central coast and in the central 
highlands. A successful, proactive casualty information 
system need not be top-heavy or bureaucratic, but does 
require central-level support, assured funding, and inte-
gration with existing health and disability data sources. If 
these objectives can be achieved in Cambodia and Laos, 
they are certainly within Vietnam’s capacity as well.
To date, international donor funding for mine action and 
victim assistance has been spread quite unevenly among the 
three countries. Cambodia has received an average of $20 
million (U.S.) per year over the last five years, or roughly $2 
per capita. Laos has received $5 million annually, around 
$1 per capita. Vietnam has averaged $5–10 million, or 
about $0.10 per capita. This discrepancy appears likely to 
continue. For instance, Australia announced in July 2005 
that it will provide $57 million for mine clearance and vic-
tim assistance in the southeast Asia region over the next five 
years. Reports indicate the majority of this funding will be 
sent to Cambodia and Laos, though Vietnam will also be 
considered. There are doubtless political as well as opera-
tional reasons for donors’ funding decisions, but given the 
similarities in UXO contamination, tampering and scrap 
metal activities and risk profiles, a more regionally balanced 
approach would seem warranted. 
The regional workshop on mine/UXO risk education 
described above offers one model of increased cooperation 
across national boundaries without high levels of bureau-
cracy or organizing costs. Other activities currently being 
implemented include multi-country research projects, site 
visits from one country to another, exchange of experiences 
within international organizations working in more than 
one country in the region and formation of informal part-
nerships among national NGOs, who may in some cases 
receive funds from the same external donor(s). Of course, 
intergovernmental cooperation remains necessary and ben-
eficial as well. The more information publicly shared and 
the more stakeholders from various sectors participate fully 
in creative problem solving, the more quickly Cambodia, 
Laos and Vietnam will move toward becoming a mine- 
and UXO-risk-free region in the future.
See “References and Endnotes,” page 104.
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Destroying the  
                          Mother
of All Arsenals”
by COL George Zahaczewsky Ret. U.S. Army 
Although the much-publicized weap-
ons of mass destruction have not 
been found in Iraq, less has been 
said about what munitions were 
found there, the hazards they pres-
ent or the efforts of Coalition Forces 
to remove the stockpiles. This ar-
ticle gives a first-hand view of the 
perils in Iraq.
O n 20 March 2003, United States and Coalition Forces crossed the border into Iraq, initiating ground combat operations during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Almost immediately, they encountered 
vast stockpiles of conventional Iraqi munitions. Much 
of the ammunition was in pristine condition, while large 
amounts of other ordnance had been looted, scavenged 
or damaged during combat operations. It soon became 
apparent that a major effort would be required to secure 
and dispose of these stockpiles.
Assessing and Managing the Problem
The discovery of these “ammo dumps” was not unexpected. Preparations to deal with 
captured enemy ammunition were part of the initial campaign planning for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom that started in October 2002. What was not appreciated until much later 
in 2003 was the scope of the problem. Ground commanders quickly put together plans 
and manpower in an attempt to secure or destroy the enormous caches of ammunition 
their units were encountering. These well-intentioned efforts would eventually produce 
mixed results and, in some instances, amplify the problem.
Increased awareness but uncertainty of the magnitude of the captured enemy ammu-
nition (CEA) problem resulted in the United States Army Corps of Engineers requesting 
to conduct an assessment in June/July 2003 to determine if their existing munitions re-
mediation programs could bring aid. Specifically, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) 
sought assistance in the munitions collection process, the transportation of the ordnance 
to disposal areas and the operation of the demolition sites themselves.
Due to the perceived urgency of the situation, CJTF-7 wanted capability in place 
within 30 days of the assessment to begin reducing or replacing military personnel 
and equipment engaged in the CEA mission (now renamed the Coalition Munitions 
Clearance program). Combined Joint Task Force 7—the “customer”—wanted the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers and its contractors to provide a “cradle-to-grave” service that 
could eventually be transferred over to Iraqi authorities.
Funding was provided to the Corps of Engineers on 28 July 2003 to commence 
CEA operations. USACE awarded several contracts on 8 Aug. 2003—one to the Parsons 
Corporation (Pasadena, Calif.) for $80 million (U.S.) to provide the logistical support for 
the overall effort, and three contracts worth $67 million each to the following unexplod-
ed ordnance contractors: Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technologies (Knoxville, Tenn.), 
Tetra Tech-Foster Wheeler (Pasadena, Calif.), and USA Environmental, Inc. (Tampa, 
Fla.). The scope of work for the contractors included the following requirements:
•  Manage ammunition supply points/collection points (ASP/CP).
•  Perform demolition of unserviceable munitions.
•  Perform demolition of priority munitions as identified by CJTF-7.
•  Perform transportation of CEA from caches to ammunition supply points/col-
lection points or demolition areas as required and transport prepared demolition 
loads of CEA from ASP/CP to the demolition area.
• Perform surface unexploded ordnance clearances, booby trap clearances, disable-
ment of unconventional warfare devices,  site investigations, evaluations and re-
sponses in support of the CEA mission.
cAPTUReD eNeMy AMMUNITION OPeRATIONS IN IRAq
A Russian FAB-5000 M54 high-explosive bomb in the vicinity of Zakho, northern Iraq (August 2004). 
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Among the populations most at risk are 
the poorest, ethnic minority groups and 
those living in remote areas—which are 
often overlapping categories.
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endnotes and References
Mine Free: Not Anytime Soon, kidd [ from page 4 ]
endnote
1. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997. 
 http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
An Operator’s Perspective on Ottawa’s Article 5, Nergaard [ from page 35 ]
endnotes
1. Anti-personnel Mines.” Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009. 29 Nov. 2004. http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/68LGY8/$File/Action%20Plan%20.pdf. 
 10 Oct. 2005. 
2. “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.” Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997.  
http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Oct. 10, 2005. 
3. ISO 9000 is a set of standards for quality management systems that is accepted around the world. For more information about the various quality certifications, visit International 
Organization for Standardization at http://www.iso.org/ or Simply Qualify’s Frequently Asked Questions about ISO 9000 at http://www.isoeasy.org/faq03.htm.
Demining in Iran, Banks [ from page 8 ]
endnotes
1. EOD World Services is the services arm of E&I International. MAI is the E&I mine action company presently operating with several other E&I companies in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.
2. Most work in Iran is for a national client. International clients demand IMAS standards and international quality assurance/quality control companies to inspect work. 
3. For more information on IMAS, see http://www.mineactionstandards.org/imas.htm. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005
4. Embankments are to contain flood water. Bunds are generally used to describe defensive positions, banks of earth and embankments. 
5. Banks-men stand on the bunds to watch for items of hazardous material that may be dug up.
Assisting Landmine Accident Survivors in the Thai-Burma Border Region, Matthee [ from page 11 ]
endnotes
1. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997. 
 http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
2. While only governments can sign the convention, non-state actors can sign the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation 
in Mine Action through an organization called Geneva Call. Geneva Call engages NSAs to respect and adhere to humanitarian norms, starting with the anti-personnel mine ban. 
For more information, see http://www.genevacall.org/home.htm. Accessed Nov. 2, 2005.
3. Simple plumb methods use a plumb line, which is a reference line guided by a string or cord weighted at the end with a large weight known as a plumb bob. It is used to create a 
reference line for creating vertical lines.
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Destroying the Mother of All Arsenals, Zahaczewsky [ from page 18 ]
endnotes
1. Associated Press. (27 April 2004). “Oregon Worker Killed in Iraq.”
2. Associated Press. (28 April 2004). “Civilian Worker: Roadside Bomb in Iraq Kills Port Orchard Man.”
3. Cha, Ariana E. (14 Nov, 2003) “Peril Follows Contractors in Iraq.” Washington Post (p. A.01).
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Hidden killers in Afghanistan, Sharif [ from page 20 ]
endnotes
1. This information is in the UNMAS Annual Report, 2004.  Visit http://www.mineaction.org/; accessed Nov. 30, 2005.
2. One square kilometre is approximately 0.386 square mile.
3. Afghanistan has also been a signatory of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons since 1981. For more information, visit 
 http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/500?OpenDocument; accessed Nov. 30, 2005.
Observations on Recent changes in Northwest cambodia’s Mine/UXO Situation, Simmonds, et al. [ from page 24 ]
endnotes
1. L1S is an abbreviation for Level One Survey that is commonly used in Cambodia. This is not to be confused with LIS (Landmine Impact Survey), which is in common use in 
most other parts of the world.
2. Bottomley, Ruth. (2001) Returning life to field and forest: Mine clearance by villagers in Cambodia. Journal of Mine Action, 5.1 p.13.  
http://www.maic.jmu.edu/journal/5.1/Focus/Ruth_Bottom/bottom.html. Accessed Nov. 22, 2005. 
3. Bottomley, Ruth. (Dec. 31, 2003). Crossing the Divide: Landmines, Villagers and Organizations. http://www.prio.no/page/preview/preview/9429/40814.html. 
 Accessed Nov. 22, 2005.
4.  Fleisher, Michael L. (2005) Informal Village Demining in Cambodia: An Operational Study. http://www.handicapinternational.be/downloads/Informal_Village_Demining.pdf. 
Accessed Nov. 22, 2005. 
 
The War Goes On, Vosburgh [ from page 27 ]
endnotes
1. In the Untied States, this conflict is referred to as the Vietnam War.
2. Vietnamese Ministry of Defense Demining Command and The Technology Center for Bomb and Mine Disposal (BOMICO/BOMICEN).
claiming the Future, Sisavath [ from page 29 ]
endnotes
1.  Mennonite Central Committee Web site, http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/report/laos_appendix.html. Accessed Nov. 15, 2005.
2.  U.S. Bombing Records in Laos, 1964–1973. Congressional Record—Senate, May 14, 1975 (p. 14,266).
3.  Handicap International Belgium. “Living with UXO—Final Report on the National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact of UXO in Lao PDR.” 1997.
4.  1 square kilometre is equal to about 0.386 square mile.
5.  The Safe Path Forward 2003–2013. April 2004. http://www.undplao.org/UXO%20stuff/Stratplan%20Res%20EngFINAL.pdf. Accessed Nov. 15, 2005.
6.  1 hectare equals approximately 2.5 acres.
Developing Alternatives: The Locality Demining Model in cambodia, Leighton [ from page 35 ]
endnotes
1. Richard Moyes in his report, Tampering: Deliberate Handling and Use of Live Ordnance in Cambodia (MAG, Handicap International-Belgium, Norwegian People’s Aid, 2004), 
recognises that deliberate handling occurs amongst the most vulnerable families with the least traditional economic opportunities such as generation of income through livestock 
or land ownership. For online text of this report see http://www.mag.org.uk/magtest/cambodia/Tampering.pdf. 
2.  Review of the locality demining model was undertaken by Pia Walgren for MAG.
3.  As observed by MAG Cambodia’s technical operations manager, Gary Fenton.
4. See work undertaken on village demining by Ruth Bottomley, HI-B. http://www.handicapinternational.be/downloads/SpontaneousDeminingInitiatives.pdf, 
 accessed Dec. 13, 2005.
Afghanistan LIS, Fruchet [ from page 38 ]
endnote
1. A Landmine Impact Survey, or LIS, is a community-based national survey that measures the extent of the impact of the landmine problem in a country, based on the number of 
recent victims, socio-economic blockages and type of munitions.
USAID’s Perspective: The Importance of Social and economic Developing Strategies for Humanitarian Mine Action, Feinberg 
[ from page 41 ]
endnotes
1.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997.  
http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
2. The Leahy War Victims Fund works on behalf of civilian victims of war and people living with disabilities. See 
 http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/the_funds/lwvf/index.html for more information. Last updated May 5, 2005. Accessed Oct. 21, 2005.
3. Learn more about the United States International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics at http://www.usispo.org/. Accessed Oct. 21, 2005.
Mine Action and Development, Turcotte [ from page 43 ]
endnotes
1. From the 2004 Nairobi Declaration by States Parties to the Ottawa Convention.
2. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997. 
 http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
3. Landmine Monitor Report 2005. International Campaign to Ban Landmines. http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/findings.html. 
4. These individuals are often called landmine survivors. For a complete definition, see http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/intro/survivor, accessed Dec. 2, 2005.
5. On Sept. 18, 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 55/2, the United Nations Millennium Declaration. At the United Nations Millennium Summit, world 
leaders agreed to a set of time-bound and measurable goals and targets for combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against 
women. Placed at the heart of the global agenda, they are now called the Millennium Development Goals. The Summit’s Millennium Declaration also outlined a wide range of 
commitments in human rights, good governance and democracy. See http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
6. World Bank. “Landmine Contamination: A Development Imperative,” Social Development Note No. 20, October 2004. Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit.
7. Information on the Geneva Conventions can be found at http://www.genevaconventions.org/. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
8. Information on the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects can be found at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/500?OpenDocument. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
Integrated Mine Action: A Rights-Based Approach in cambodia, campbell [ from page 45 ]
endnote
1. The Millennium Development Goals are eight goals adopted by the government to eradicate poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality, 
reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/Aids, malaria, and other diseases, ensure environmental stability and develop a global partnership for development, 
all by 2015. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. Accessed Nov. 1, 2005.
How can economists contribute to Mine Action, Marsh [ from page 51 ]
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